On ultimatum bargaining experiments: A personal review

Bargaining

Are moral objections to free riding evolutionarily stable?

Game Theory;Public Goods

Is altruism evolutionarily stable ?

We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the success of players with different preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors altruistic or selfish attitudes. The outcome depends on whether the individuals' interactions are strategic complements or substitutes. Altruism and self-interest are context dependent.Game Theory;Altruism;game theory

Indirect Evolution Versus Strategic Delegation: A Comparison of Two Approaches to Explaining Economic Institutions

The two major methods of explaining economic institutions, namely by strategic choices or by (indirect) evolution, are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. Sellers either can provide incentives for their agents to care for sales (amounts) or evolve as sellers who care for sales in addition to profits. Whereas strategic delegation does not change the market results as compared to the usual duopoly solution, indirect evolution causes a more competitive behavior. Thus the case at hand suffices to demonstrate the difference between the two approaches in explaining economic institutions.noncooperative games;duopoly;organizational behavior

Endogenous Preemption on Both Sides of a Market

We study a market in which both buyers and sellers can decide to preempt and set their quantities before market clearing.Will this lead to preemption on both sides of the market, only one side of the market, or to no preemption at all?We find that preemption tends to be asymmetric in the sense that it is restricted to only one side of the market (buyers or sellers).preemption;endogenous timing

Gorby games: A game theoretic analysis of disarmament campaigns and the defense efficiency-hypothesis

Game Theory;Disarmament